Arsenal’s pursuit of the Premier League in 23/24 has earned Mikel Arteta and his young squad a lot of plaudits, and Set Plays, particularly Corners, played a key role in their strong title charge.
Arteta has improved Arsenal season-on-season since his appointment, and his Set Piece Coach; Nicolas Jover has clearly had a major impact. The pair met at Manchester City, the club who had poached Jover from Brentford. Arsenal's meticulous planning of dead balls led to 20 Set Piece goals in 23/24.
Their Corners in particular, almost NFL-like in their play-by-play approach, has been refreshing and has probably broken new ground in terms of the detail and standard at elite level. Below I have looked at some key principles of Arsenal’s success from corners.
1. Delivery
99% of Arsenal’s Corner were inswinging deliveries in 23/24 (FBRef). This is clearly something that Arteta has been set on for a while, with 95% of their corners were also inswinging deliveries during 22/23. There are a few clear advantages of being so consistent in approach.
A) Repetition
B) Delivery Zone
C) Flick Ons
A) Repetition
We often hear the phrase 'practice makes perfect' and Arsenal's repetition of inswinging deliveries from corners certainly adheres to this.
Bukayo Saka took 99 inswinging corners in the Premier League in 23/24.
Each time the Gunners win a corner, Saka knows that he’s going to be taking an inswinging kick and he knows the zone he needs to hit. He will most likely practice this technique most days in training, resulting in strong muscle memory of this action.
Declan Rice took 38 inswingers, Martinelli 30, Trossard 22. Every designated taker is clearly comfortable with their inswinging technique and particularly Saka whose open play inverted crossing angles rely on the same body mechanics as an inswinging corner.
If Arsenal took 50% of corners inswinging, and 50% outswinging, it’s still highly likely that they’d be a major threat however there is something to be said for the simplicity of a consistent routine – it’s one less variable to think about.
B) Delivery Zone
Due to Arsenal’s consistent movement patterns from corners there is clearly a designated delivery zone for the taker to hit for each routine.
Yes, there are variations of movements and routines, however by and large the taker is looking to hit a similar spot with each delivery. Again, this consistency makes it easier for the kick taker to perfect their action and hit the targeted zone. Moreover, with the natural curvature of inswingers, there is arguably a greater margin for error compared to that of outswingers, although this point has been debated by some.
The trajectory of a whipped inswinger is naturally towards the goal line, where more players are bunched (due to Arsenal’s designed movements) and thus there isn't an extremely specific spot to hit. Comparing this to an outswinger, where they may be one designated target player to hit for example, there is a greater “margin for error”.
If the outswinging cross is overhit, it likely evades the target player and continues away from goal, whereas if the inswinging cross is overhit, there is likely a bunch of players around the keeper and there is an increased possibility of a a player contact or ricochet.
C) Flick Ons
Similar to the point above, the inswinger allows for a greater possibility of a flick on and Arsenal have scored multiple goals from these scenarios in 23/24. Due to the trajectory of the inswinger towards goal as mentioned, a simple flick on at the front post can cause havoc for the defending team.
By moving across the front post to meet an inswinger, attacking players can disrupt the vision of defenders, and the keeper, and this can occasionally lead to own goals, which Arsenal forced 3 of from corners during the 23/24 season.
If a defender meets the flight of an outswinger by comparison, he’s more likely to direct the ball away from goal, as that’s where it is already heading.
So, consistently inswinging corners allow for a clear routine, muscle memory, direct trajectory towards goal, more margin for error and an increased possibility of flick ons and ricochets. This tactics clearly worked exceptionally well for Arsenal and it’s highly likely that they will continue this into 24/25.
2. Exploiting Weakness
Arsenal have clear principles running through every corner; however they are incredibly pragmatic in tweaking their approach to exploit weaknesses based on their opponents.
For example, when facing teams who use a man-to-man marking system, Arsenal look to dominate and exploit the opponent’s weakest man markers with designed movements to isolate this particular defender.
If an opposition team defends using “blockers”, potentially naturally attacking players who struggle to watch the ball, the attacker, as well as blocking lines of movement, all at the same time, Arsenal will lock onto these players and easily beat the block.
If the opposition Keeper is particularly weak handling crosses, Arsenal will use 1 or 2 players within the Keeper’s zone to block, pinch, stand on, maybe sometimes even foul – this was clear against James Trafford for Burnley at the Emirates.
If the opposition use a traditional zonal marking set up to defend corners, with 2 zonal Markers at the front post and then 3 or 4 along the 6 yard line, they will tend to use a “block” of 4 or 5 of their dominant aerial threats starting from the back post and moving across the box.
If opposition pack their 6 yard box with a block, Arsenal may use “short” options as a decoy to potentially remove 1 or 2 opposition defenders from the box, thus reducing the defensive cover in key zones.
Due to Arsenal’s sheer frequency of corners, they’re able to use the first few as “markers”, in knowing that they will likely have a few more to come.
Arteta and Jover clearly analyse their opposition’s defensive corner approach in great detail and they are extremely flexible from game to game in order to to exploit the biggest weaknesses.
3. Player Movement
There are clearly designated roles within the Arsenal set up regarding movement.
For example, William Saliba is often tasked with moving across the face of goal as a decoy, compared to Gabriel who is often tasked with starting deeper and arriving to meet a cross.
Saliba is probably slightly less physically powerful, with less of a jump and hang ability than Gabriel, however he is definitely more fluid with his body movements and is thus more suitable to moving across opponents and weaving into gaps for example.
Arsenal’s movements are incredibly well timed – starting before the corner kick taker begins his approach. Players often work in pairs or in conjunction, particularly against man marking systems, with opposite movements, blocks, decoy runs all designed to create space to maximise a 1v1 duel or to create a spare man.
As mentioned, Arsenal have key principles which are tweaked game to game but they can generally be defined by:
A) Dominant Block
B) Front Post Movement
C) Safety Net
A) Dominant Block
Arsenal’s recruitment has increased their physical dominance in both boxes – Havertz, Rice, Tomiyasu plus Saliba, Gabriel, White, all of whom are physically imposing in different ways.
Arsenal generally use up to 5 of these players in a “block”, particularly against zonal systems.
Gabriel and Havertz tend to start in this block and Saliba, White, Tomiyasu, Jesus, Partey, Rice, Kiwior all flitter between the block and other roles, depending on the specifics of the opposition.
This block of players is generally physically dominant in open play and this translates into dead balls. An example of this block is below, with Gabriel, Havertz, Saliba and Kiwior starting in a block beyond the back post.
The advantage of starting the block this deep, beyond the far post, is three-fold:
1) The opposition cannot see both the block and the ball
2) The block are able to build momentum with movement across the box
3) Increased space for the kick taker to hit
Moreover, starting the block so deep, and emptying the front post area, completely negates the opposition’s zonal markers at the front post. As below, West Ham’s 4 zonal markers are removed from the phase of player here. The West Ham defenders “in play” cannot see both man and ball, so there is a dynamic advantage for Arsenal here.
Again, against Brighton we see Arsenal deploy a dominant block of players starting at the back of the box, this time with White, Gabriel, Havertz and Jesus. This time there are 3 opposition blockers within this zone, so immediately Arsenal have a 4v3 advantage and they are able to manipulate the free man (Jesus).
Furthermore, there are 4 Brighton players marking zonally at the front of the goal. 3 of these are at the front post so they are removed from the phase due to the deep positioning of the Arsenal block and the delivery, with only Van Hecke able to have an influence defensively.
Like against West Ham, the Arsenal “block” move across the area to drag away and manipulate the 3 Brighton blockers. Due to Arsenal’s 4v3 advantage in this zone, Jesus becomes free and he simply stays static throughout. This is a good example of how to simply manipulate a partly zonal, partly man to man block, as the defender will naturally be attracted to movement.
Using physically dominant, tall profiles within this block allows Arsenal a physical advantage, as well as dynamic advantage via their movements. When combining this with the 4v3 numerical advantage, it’s not surprisng that they are able to free Jesus so easily. This is excellent coaching detail to select the correct profiles, movements and delivery which leads to Jesus nodding home unmarked.
A point I will touch on more shortly and is well evidenced below, with Arsenal’s physical advantage allowing them to block and manipulate opponents with momentum and strength. Saliba has moved into space across goal, but Havertz and Gabriel initiate physical contact and draw opponents away from Jesus, creating space for him at the back post.
As the routine develops, Arsenal’s block congregate around the 6 yard area and flood that zone, making it impossible for the defenders and keeper to clear. The flick on reaches Jesus who is free to nod home 6 yards out.
In summary, this block of players made up of the more physically dominant Arsenal players is extremely effective in moving across the box, flooding the 6 yard zone, manipulating opponents and creating space.
B. Front post movement
As previously mentioned, Arsenal tend to use their dominant block starting beyond than the back post, however they consistently use movements towards the front post and a delivery into the centre of the 6 yard box too.
The principles remain the same – inswinging delivery, dominant block targeted, qualitative and dynamic advantage and safety net around the edge of the box (more on that later).
A clear example of this front post movement is Kai Havertz’s goal against Spurs. Again, the dominant block (White, Saliba, Gabriel, Tomiyasu, Partey) start deep and move across the box , this time past the front post, with Havertz heading in adjacent to the front post.
As Brighton did, Spurs use a partly zonal, partly man blocker system. Maddison, Bentancur and Kulusevski are the 3 “blockers” here – none of them defensively robust. Instantly Arsenal have both a numerical (5v3) and physical advantage here and the block are able to move away from the blockers with relative ease.
Another advantage Arsenal have is that the zonal markers for Spurs in the middle of the box and front post area are all square to the ball and thus are blindsided by Arsenal movement across the box – this is akin to having a blind spot advantage attacking the box in open play.
Partey is able to move across the 6 yard box to the front post with well timed movement to initiate contact and duel with the front post zonal marker to prevent the clearance. To link in with the initial advantage I wrote about of the inswinging cross, if the defender gets a touch on the cross here it’s highly likely to be a ricochet off the top of his head into the danger area.
Finally we see Gabriel and Havertz climb and hang due to their physical qualities and the fact that their zonal opponents were unprepared for contact due to their square body position defending the cross. Havertz heads in with a well-timed leap, physically dominant with a 1v1 advantage enabled by the front post movement ahead of him.
Arsenal used a similar front post movement routine to score against Newcastle too. Again, same principles apply, the dominant block starts behind the back post and Gabriel ends up heading in adjacent to the front post.
Newcastle used 3 man marking blockers vs the 3 man dominant block. Again however Arsenal immediately have the dynamic advantage as the Newcastle defenders are unable to mark man and ball and they are purely reactive to Arsenal’s movement and are unable to grapple/block effectively.
The block moves towards the middle and front of the box and Newcastle’s zonal markers are clearly uncomfortable defending against the movement. Ben White also moves from his usual position around the keeper towards the front post to add to the flood this zone.
As the ball is delivered Arsenal have the momentum advantage, plus as with before, Newcastle’s defenders are unable to see man and ball and they are too square to defend against leaps. White and Saliba move across the front post and swarm the zonal marker there, preventing any clearance. Gabriel bursts into this space to head home.
These front post movements are well designed to prevent clearances and impact the vision of the markers within the 6 yard box, plus it completely inhibits the keeper from impacting this area. As mentioned, the fact that the zonal markers are often square, and the blocking man markers aren’t natural defenders, provides Arsenal with an advantage.
C. Safety Net
As well as dominating physically and dynamically in the box, Arsenal are able to control the perimeter around the box with a “safety net” to allow for 2nd phases and to prevent transitions.
Thinking about the kick taker inswinging the cross towards the box, if a front post zonal marker is able to head clear, it’s likely that the clearance will end up in the vicinity of the Corner taker, who can then cross again naturally with another inswinger.
Failing this, Arsenal usually have 2 or 3 attackers around the 18 yard line. The idea behind that they are able to sweep up 2nd balls and they are able to dominate each angle of clearance. As below, we see Odegaard, Saka and Zinchenko as the safety net.
These players aren’t physically dominant, and they are all technically able to control, offload and perform technical actions effectively, so it makes sense to use them in this zone.
This is another of Arsenal’s principles to retain control of the set play scenario and it clearly works . They tweak this net depending on opposition, and the below against Chelsea is a good example and it combines blocking with the safety net.
1. Dominant block past back post.
2. Man impacting keeper (Ben White).
3. 2 physically dominant blockers (Saliba and Gabriel)
4. Safety Net – 2v1 advantage in short corner, 2 free man on edge of box
Arsenal go short due to the 2v1 advantage with Mudryk (defensively weak) attempting to defend vs Saka and Odegaard. Arsenal have the numerical advantage here and easily manipulate a pass scenario.
Saliba moves towards ball, forcing his blocker back and increasing the space between defenders and the men on the edge of the box (Rice and Trossard).
As the pass is laid off to Rice there is lots of space for him to angle his shot, plus Saliba has forced his man into a very deep position, playing everybody else onside.
Due to the chaos created by the dominant block entering the middle of the box, the keeper is unsighted and defenders are unable to sort their feet out. Rice’s shot is blocked and falls into the path of White who fires home, played onside due to Saliba’s movement.
This is a good example of Arsenal using the safety net in an advantageous and pragmatic way, as well as using blocking and movement to create chaos and advantages.
4. Blocking
A key component to Arsenal’s corner success has been the art of blocking, as well as the general dark arts around disrupting the keeper.
This is clearly well coached and is extremely detailed, with Ben White and Leandro Trossard being the key players in this regard.
There is currently a grey area surrounding blocking when it comes to VAR, and Arsenal have exploited this to great effect to impact the opponents’ aerially dominant defenders.
A key detail is that the blocker will often start in the blind spot of his target and then he moves into position to block once the ball has been delivered. This prevents the defender from anticipation the block.
A good example of this was Trossard’s blocking of Joachim Andersen for Gabriels’s goal against Palace. Andersen is the zonal marker in the middle of the box and is the key defender here due to his size and aerial effectiveness. Trossard is initially behind the back post and is blocked himself by a man marker, however due to his dynamic advantage he is able to dismark and then impact Andersen.
As Trossard moves across into Andersen’s zone, the Danish defender is square and completely unaware of the Belgian and thus doesn’t anticipate the contact. Trossard’s movement will impact Andersen, but it has also emptied the back post area and allows Gabriel to move into that zone to ultimately score.
Trossard ends up in a really low, crouched position to centre his body weight and anchor into Andersen. This prevents the Palace defender from swiping him aside. Gabriel is able to run up, leap and hang to score.
5. Player Profiles
As mentioned earlier Arsenal’s recent recruitment has clearly been focussed towards improving their physical dominance which aids in dead ball scenarios.
Rice, Kiwior, Havertz, Tomiyasu are all physically strong, robust in contact and able to generate different physical and dynamic advantages to add to Saliba and Gabriel’s qualities.
Rice generates impressive running power and has a strong frame, Havertz similar with impressive spatial awareness, and Kiwior and Tomiyasu are strong in duels and add height. These signings have added to Arsenal’s threat from set plays.
As well as this, they are well balanced by the “safety net” players in Odegaard, Zinchenko, Jorginho, Saka who are able to manipulate the ball in dead ball and 2nd phase scenarios.
Ben White, Gabriel Jesus, Martinelli and Saliba all play dual roles as “blockers”, “runners” or decoy movers within Arsenal’s principles.
All in all they have an outstanding balance of ball strikers, aerial threats, physical advantages and tactical awareness to carry out detailed plans. As a result they have become formidable in attacking corner scenarios and are hard to stop as they have detailed solutions to each defensive set up.
Conclusion
Jover has made a huge impact in making this Arsenal side a major threat from corners.
· Inswinging Delivery
· Exploiting Opposition Weaknesses
· Dominant Block
· Movement to Manipulate Defenders
· Creating Qualitative, Dynamic and Numerical advantages
· Blocking
· Safety Net
· Player Profiles
All of the above are the product of clear planning and respect shown towards set pieces, something we probably don’t see enough of, although it is clearly changing as the game evolves.
Article by Oliver O'Connell, Oli is a Senior Recruitment Analyst with 3 season’s experience working in Belgium’s Pro League.
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